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 July 2002 - The
International Crisis Group (ICG) simultaneously
released three major reports
calling on the U.S. to
lead the ‘Quartet’ (U.S., EU, Russia and UN) and ‘Trio’ (Egypt, Saudi Arabia
and Jordan) in presenting and pushing a comprehensive peace initiative to
achieve once and for all, a fair and durable peace between Israel and its
Arab neighbours. Below is the Executive Summary.
Go to the International Crisis Group
for the entire report. Robert Malley serves as the ICG's Middle East
Program Director.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY & RECOMMENDATIONS
President Bush,
announcing U.S. policy towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict on 24 June
2002, has set the terms of the international response to the conflict for
the immediately foreseeable period. Before peace can be negotiated the
violence has to stop. If the Palestinians are to have their own state – and
the clear message is that they should – it must be one based on the
principles of democracy, transparency and the rule of law. For that to
happen the current leadership needs to go. The logic is sequential:
political progress is conditional on a new security environment,
institutional reform and, in effect, on regime change.
But as much as
we would wish events to prove us wrong, it is difficult to believe that the
present Bush Plan can stop the violence and deliver a fair and sustainable
peace within a reasonable time. The ends stated by the President are
laudable – an end to the Israeli occupation, a two-state solution, and
resolution of the questions of borders, Jerusalem and refugees within a
relatively short period. But the means are questionable. The first incentive
offered is the prospect of a "provisional State of Palestine", but one
without permanent borders, a capital or anything resembling the usual
attributes of sovereignty. The second is the possibility of final status
negotiations between Israelis and Palestinians being concluded within three
years, but no roadmap is on the table, nor any clear international
commitment to making it happen.
It is hard to
conceive that violence will come to an end – morally wrong and politically
counterproductive though its worst manifestations may be – before
Palestinians see a genuine alternative path to ending the occupation and
realising their legitimate aspirations. The call to choose new leaders and
to reform institutions is more likely to generate increased support for
Arafat, and undermine those within Palestinian society who have long been
calling for fundamental change. Without more stimulus than what is now on
offer, regional and local dynamics are unlikely to change in any
constructive way.
ICG argues in
this report, and its two companions published simultaneously, that while
there are other approaches which could add real momentum to the peace
process (including in particular a comprehensive settlement initiative by a
broad-based Israeli-Palestinian peace coalition), there is only one way to
ensure an end to the violence and produce a fair, effective and sustainable
resolution of the region’s problems in a timely fashion. And that is for the
key international players, led by the U.S., to put on the table clear,
detailed and comprehensive blueprints for a permanent Israeli-Palestinian
agreement – and for Israel-Syria and Israel-Lebanon peace treaties as well –
and to press strenuously for their acceptance.
The key players
for this purpose are the already established Quartet (U.S., EU, Russia and
UN Secretary-General) and the influential Arab “Trio” (Egypt, Saudi Arabia
and Jordan), who would together constitute a Contact Group to lead the
strategy and oversee its implementation. An international peace conference,
of the kind floated but for the moment abandoned by the U.S., would be a
useful forum to lay out – alongside the other tracks (security,
institutional reform and economic support) which should be pursued in
parallel on the Israeli-Palestinian front – the comprehensive political
plans required, and demonstrate, unequivocally, the degree of international
support for them. We do not suggest that a comprehensive political blueprint
is the only necessary ingredient in the international policy mix - but at
present it is the indispensable missing one.
The goal would
not be to impose a settlement on the Israeli or Palestinian
leaderships but rather to generate so much domestic and international
support for it that opposition would become increasingly hard to sustain and
the momentum for change gradually would become irresistible. The
presentation of a comprehensive settlement plan would need to be seen as the
beginning, not the end, of the public diplomacy required, which would be
aimed above all at changing attitudes and reshaping the political
environment among Israelis and Palestinians.
This first
“Endgame” report describes the overall strategy required, assesses the
degree of political difficulty involved in implementing it, and sketches in
outline form the content of the comprehensive Israeli-Arab settlement plans
we propose. The second and third reports go into much more detail on the
substance of, respectively, an Israeli-Palestinian settlement, and
Israel-Syria and Israel-Lebanon peace treaties. These latter two are
critical as well, for winning over the Israeli public will require that
leaders of the Arab world state their readiness to normalise relations with
Israel, something that is hard to imagine without a settlement of all
outstanding Arab-Israeli disputes. Moreover, the Israeli-Lebanese border
remains volatile and arguably presents a greater threat to regional
stability than the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
In outline form,
the elements of the various agreements suggested by ICG, based on our
presence in the region and extensive consultations around it over the last
few months, are as follows:
Bilateral
Israeli-Palestinian agreement
The borders of the
State of Palestine will be based on the lines of 4 June 1967. Israel will
annex up to 4 per cent of land in the West Bank to accommodate a majority of
its settlers; in exchange, Palestine will receive land from Israel of equal
size and actual or potential value.
Palestine will be a
non-militarised state; and there will be a fully-mandated and capable
U.S.-led multinational force to monitor implementation of the agreement and
enhance both sides’ sense of confidence and security.
Israel will have
sovereignty over West Jerusalem and the Jewish neighbourhoods of East
Jerusalem which, together, will constitute its capital. Palestine will have
sovereignty over the Arab neighbourhoods of East Jerusalem, which will
constitute its capital.
There will be a
special regime governing the Old City, which will remain open, and sites of
special significance in Jerusalem’s Historic Basin. Under this regime,
Palestine will govern the Haram al-Sharif (Temple Mount) and Israel will
govern the Kotel (Wailing Wall). There will be internationally-backed
guarantees against any excavation of or building on the Haram al-Sharif
without the parties’ express consent.
The refugee issue
will be resolved in a way that addresses the Palestinians’ deep sense of
injustice without undermining Israel’s demographic interests. Both parties
will agree that UN General Assembly Resolution 194 will be satisfied by
Palestinian refugees receiving financial compensation and resettlement
assistance; having the choice between relocation to Palestine, relocation to
lands within Israel proper that will be swapped with the state of Palestine,
relocation to third countries or rehabilitation in host countries; and
returning to Israel on the basis of family reunification and humanitarian
programs continued or newly established by Israel.
The agreement will
mark the end of the conflict. The only claims either party can raise that
arise out of their historic conflict will be those related to implementation
of the agreement.
Multilateral
supporting agreement
-
International recognition of the States of Israel and Palestine, with Arab
states fully normalising relations with Israel.
- A
U.S.-led multinational force to monitor compliance with the agreement,
patrol and monitor Palestine’s international borders, and deter by its
presence attacks against either party.
- An
international police presence and civilian administration for the Old City
and Historic Basin sites to assist in the policing, protection and
preservation of this area.
- An
international commission on refugees responsible for implementing all
aspects of the bilateral agreement.
- Major
commitments by the international donor community to assist in Palestine’s
reconstruction and long-term development.
Israel-Syria
agreement
- The
boundary between Israel and Syria will be the line of 4 June 1967. A
commission headed by the Chief Cartographer of the United Nations will
demarcate the precise line.
- Syria
will have sovereignty over the land up to the Kinneret/Lake Tiberias and the
Jordan River and access to the adjoining water; Israel will have sovereignty
over the Kinneret/Lake Tiberias and the Jordan River and access to the
adjoining land.
- There
will be demilitarised zones and areas of limitation in armament and forces
in Syria and in Israel.
- A
U.S.-led multinational monitoring, inspection and verification mechanism
will verify implementation of the security arrangements, and the U.S. will
operate an early warning station on Mount Hermon.
- The parties will rapidly establish diplomatic ties once the
treaty has come into effect and will implement steps that characterise
peaceful, normal relations between neighbours.
Israel-Lebanon
agreement
- The
boundary between Israel and Lebanon will be the 1923 boundary. A bilateral
Boundary Commission will demarcate the precise and final border.
- Within
a “frontier zone” consisting of southern Lebanon and northern Israel, each
side will exclude irregular armed groups and individuals bearing weapons and
will maintain sufficient official forces to implement the exclusion.
- Israel
and Lebanon will prevent the operation within their territory of any group
that threatens the security of the other.
- The
parties will establish diplomatic ties and implement steps characteristic of
peaceful, normal relations between neighbours.
In the current
environment, ICG has no illusions about the degree of difficulty involved in
persuading the U.S. administration to change its present course, and getting
our preferred approach to take wing. Other potentially productive approaches
all have their own problems: so far as the emergence of a strong
locally-based Israeli-Palestinian peace coalition is concerned, the ground
is stony indeed.
But nor can
anyone ignore the immensity of the pain and suffering that continues to
afflict Israelis and Palestinians as a result of the present conflict. There
is something deeply disturbing, even tragic, in the endless pursuit of yet
another interim or partial cure when the outlines of a fair, lasting and
comprehensive agreement are there for all to see.
Our assessment
is that this cycle of violence will persist until a dramatic new initiative
is taken – one that has a real chance of fundamentally changing the dynamics
on the ground on both sides. This report, and its companions, provide the
arguments – and treaty building blocks – for such an initiative.
RECOMMENDATIONS
To the
“Quartet” (U.S., EU, Russia and UN Secretary-General) and “Trio” (Egypt,
Saudi Arabia and Jordan)
1. Craft
comprehensive Israeli-Palestinian, Israeli-Syrian and Israeli-Lebanese peace
settlements. These settlements should be detailed enough to leave little
room for ambiguity and seek to address all sides’ core interests. In the
Israeli-Palestinian context in particular, the proposed settlement should
involve an important role for a U.S.-led multinational presence to make up
for the lack of trust between the two sides.
2. Present
and promote these settlement plans in such a way as to maximise
international pressure and confidence-building. An international peace
conference would be a useful forum for presenting the plans and
demonstrating international support for them. The primary target audience
should be the Israeli and Palestinian people, whose support will be
critical. They should see clearly before them a concrete alternative to the
current situation, backed in words and in deeds by key members of the
international community. These countries should pledge to support
implementation of the agreement through concrete military, economic and
diplomatic means.
3. In
parallel, intensify efforts on other Israeli-Palestinian issues. The
international community should simultaneously seek to bring an end to the
violence, promote Palestinian institutional reform and assist in the
economic rehabilitation of the West Bank and Gaza.
To the
European Union, the Arab world and other relevant parties
4. Seek to
persuade the United States of the urgency of pursuing a comprehensive
settlement initiative. Persuasion must be more than verbal alone and
should involve pledges of concrete support in the event the U.S. responds.
In particular, Arab countries should commit to publicly back a detailed U.S.
peace plan and take other steps to reassure the Israeli public of its
intentions. European countries, Canada, Japan and others should commit to
providing substantial logistical and financial assistance in the event an
agreement is reached and helping with the rehabilitation and relocation of
Palestinian refugees.
5. As a
fallback, try to encourage the U.S. to at least amend its approach by
front-loading political elements and watering down its strict conditionality
To Israelis
and Palestinians
6. Seek to
reach a comprehensive, non-official Israeli-Palestinian settlement agreement.
A broad-based coalition of Israelis and Palestinians should seek to agree on
terms of settlement addressing in detail the two sides’ vital needs. To
maximise its impact and credibility, this agreement should be endorsed on
the Palestinian side by at least some significant Palestinian Authority
officials, and on the Israeli side by individuals trusted by large segments
of the public.
Amman/Washington/Brussels, 16 July 2002
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