May 31,
2004
Jerome M. Segal
|
Between 1975
and 1988, American diplomats, by American law, were prevented from contact
with representatives of the PLO. Today, American diplomats, directed by
President Bush, refuse any contact with PLO Chairman Arafat. Then, as now,
the central issue was terrorism, (which can be defined as the intentional
targeting of civilians). The impasse of earlier years was not resolved until
Yasser Arafat, following his speech to the United Nations General Assembly
in December 1988, explicitly stated that the PLO "renounces terrorism."
Today, under the Roadmap, more is asked than a halt or renunciation of
terrorism. The Roadmap calls on the Palestinian Authority, in Phase One, to
"confront those engaged in terror" and to "dismantle terrorist
infrastructure."
In this
situation, we might take note of Israeli experience in 1948 with respect to
the Altelena, a ship that was carrying weapons to supply Menachem Begin's
Irgun. At the time, many characterized the Irgun as a terrorist
organization. Rather than letting the arms shipment reach the Irgun, Ben
Gurion ordered his troops to sink the ship. Twenty Irgun fighters were
killed and some eighty wounded. The Altelena incident is often cited by
Israelis and Americans as an example of the kind of step that Arafat must
take in relation to Hamas and other groups. But the Altelena history is
complex and needs to be read with some care.
First, it
should be remembered that the Altelena incident occurred in June of 1948;
that is, it occurred after the State of Israel had been established
and recognized by the world powers. Thus, what Ben Gurion was asserting was
not the dominance of his faction, but rather the standard attribute of
statehood: the monopoly of power of a State within the area of its claimed
sovereignty.
Secondly, it
should be noted that once the State of Israel was established, Begin himself
accepted the need for, at least, a partial transformation of the Irgun away
from its identity as a non-state military actor. Thus, on May 15, 1948, the
day the State of Israel was proclaimed, Begin went on the radio saying:
"The Irgun is
leaving the underground within the boundaries of the Hebrew independent
state.... Now we have Hebrew rule in part of our Homeland. In this part
there is no need for a Hebrew underground. In the state of Israel, we shall
be soldiers and builders. We shall respect its Government, for it is our
Government."
Here Begin was
not calling for the complete dismantling of the Irgun. He makes a
distinction between inside and outside, between those territories under and
those not under the rule of the Israeli state. Within the areas of the
Israeli state, he accepted the sovereignty of the government.
Third, though
the Altelena incident was a decisive turning point, the Altelena was a
single incident. It did not open an extended civil war that physically
crushed and killed the Irgun forces. Rather, Irgun fighters were integrated
into the Israeli Army, though in some instances they retained their separate
identity until the end of the 1948-49 war, after which they either disbanded
or were absorbed into the forces of the State.
What all of
this should make clear is that the issue of achieving a monopoly of force is
radically different in the context of the emergence of a new state. When the
new state emerges, non-state actors may well understand and accept the need
for a transformation in their organizations. The term "dismantling the
terrorist infrastructure" rather than implying sustained military
confrontation or civil war, can mean the integration of non-state fighters
into the army of the state.
For
Palestinian society, such an evolution will ultimately occur, and as was the
case with Israel, it will likely await the establishment of the Palestinian
state. The key policy questions are “When?” and “How?” The standard answer
sees the establishment of the Palestinian state as dependent upon
negotiations with Israel. The problem however is that the inability of the
Palestinian Authority to achieve a monopoly of force has been used by the
Sharon government to halt the very negotiations that could lead to
statehood.
A solution to
this impasse lies in taking seriously the example of the Zionist movement,
which established its state pursuant to a UN General Assembly Resolution,
even though that resolution (UNGA Res. 181) was rejected by the Palestinians
and the Arab world. The Zionist movement did not ask for permission. They
asserted their self-determination. The key question is whether, today,
supported by a new General Assembly Resolution, a Palestinian state can also
be established unilaterally -- without asking or gaining Israeli permission
to do so.
It will be
remembered that this question emerged in 1988, one year into the first
Intifada. And at that time a decision was made in favor of a unilateral
Declaration of Independence. This was issued at the 19th PNC which convened
in Algiers in November 1988.
Palestinian experience with the unilateral assertion of
independence was mixed. There was a partial success in that over 100
countries recognized the State of Palestine. However, neither the United
States, Israel, nor the European nations provided recognition. Further, the
United States led an effort to block the admission of the State of Palestine
into United Nations agencies. Ultimately, after the US blocked State of
Palestine admission into the World Health Organization (WHO), the campaign
for recognition was abandoned. It was hoped, at the time, that this would
result in an improvement in the newly started US-PLO dialogue under the
first President Bush. Ultimately there was the Madrid conference and the
Oslo agreement. But genuine statehood never emerged.
To many, a
repetition of this experience must seem like a futile and empty gesture. Yet
conditions have changed enough to warrant a serious reappraisal. Today, the
unilateral establishment of a Palestinian State would certainly meet with
greater success on the diplomatic level. Palestinian statehood, though it
means different things to different parties, is now universally accepted as
a goal. The United Nations Security Council has endorsed, with American
support, the goal of a Palestinian State. The Roadmap itself, in Phase Two,
calls for the establishment of a Palestinian State with provisional
boundaries. And if such a state achieved a monopoly of force, it is quite
likely that all of the European nations would recognize it. Further, if the
new Palestinian state was able to integrate non-state actors into a single
state structure, it is likely that the United States would also accept, as a
fait accompli, that a Provisional Palestinian State has replaced the PA, as
was contemplated in the Roadmap for Phase Two. After all, the United States
has already accepted the precedent that Israel can act unilaterally so long
as its actions as "consistent" with the goals of the Road Map. If Israel can
act unilaterally, then why not the Palestinians? Given its deteriorating
situation in Iraq, it will be very difficult for the United States to
forcefully oppose a unilateral Palestinian move to statehood.
Here is how
such an approach might evolve into a strategy that seizes control of the
diplomatic process and leads to genuine independence:
1. As a result
of Palestinian and Arab diplomacy, the General Assembly of the United
Nations, calls on the Palestinian Liberation Organization to establish the
government of a Palestinian State, and to achieve a monopoly of power within
Palestinian society.
2. The General
Assembly further urges that this Palestinian State announce its willingness
to use the Geneva Accord (as negotiated by Yasser Abed Rabbo, former head of
the PLO negotiating team) as the reference framework for official
negotiations with the Israeli government. The General Assembly would call
for a period of nine months of negotiations to see if the two sides could
reach any agreed modifications in the Geneva Accord. The Accord, as
modified, would become the final peace treaty. If no modifications can be
agreed upon, then it will be accepted in unmodified form.
3. The General
Assembly would also call upon Israel to enter into final status negotiations
with the State of Palestine on this basis, provided that the Palestinian
state exercises a monopoly of power with respect to all Palestinian forces.
4. The PLO in
concord with the Palestinian Authority establishes a Government of the State
of Palestine. It claims as its sovereign territory all of the West Bank, the
Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem. However, as requested by the General Assembly
it announces its willingness to use the Geneva Accord as the starting point
for negotiations with Israel.
5. The new
government of the State of Palestine establishes a 60 day procedure during
which any armed Palestinian factions can seek integration within the armed
forces of the state. After those 60 days, it will be illegal for any
individuals or factions outside of state authority to bear arms. Once 60
days have passed the monopoly of state power is vigorously enforced. This
might even include the establishment of a compulsory national service
program which would require the enlistment of all males between the ages of
18 and 26.
6. With the
establishment of a Palestinian monopoly of power, the General Assembly calls
on the Quartet to recognize the State of Palestine and to move to Phase
Three of the Road Map, based on the Geneva Accords as a starting point.
7. The State
of Palestine announces its unilateral suspension of armed struggle for a
period of one year so as to create an atmosphere conducive to negotiations.
It calls on Israel to announce a similar cease fire.
8. The State
of Palestine announces plans for its first national election. The General
Assembly calls on Israel to facilitate these elections, allowing for the
emergence of the first democratic Arab state.
9. At this
point Israel will have to choose. Either it agrees or refuses to negotiate
on the basis outlined by the General Assembly. Given that much of the
Israeli public and many in the Labor Party have endorsed the Geneva Accords,
Israel will face an historic decision. Possibly there will be new elections
or a national referendum.
Assuming the
negative case, that Israel refuses to enter negotiations, then the new State
of Palestine will launch a worldwide effort to isolate Israel both
economically and diplomatically. An intensive campaign using the United
Nations and the World Court would be undertaken. It would have a simple
focus. The State of Palestine has been established pursuant to a General
Assembly resolution. It has been widely recognized around the world. Israel
has refused to negotiate, thus, there is only one response: Israel must
withdraw from the territory of the State of Palestine and end its blockage
of borders with Jordan, Egypt and the Mediterranean Sea.
This campaign
would be unrelenting, and would continue to put pressure on the United
States, pressing it to join the rest of the world in calling for an end to
the occupation, either through negotiations or otherwise. Given the new
conditions created by:
-
the achievement of a monopoly of force by the Palestinian state;
-
the unilateral cease fire adopted by the State,
-
the support of the General Assembly and the European states, and
- America's need to repair the damage done by President Bush's
Iraq policies,
it is likely
that this campaign will be successful. It should be remembered that even now
a majority of Israelis already are supporting one or another plan for
unilateral withdrawal from some or all of the occupied territory. Following
the scenario outlined above, it can be expected that at least a substantial
evacuation will be achieved. This in turn will lead to a consolidation of
the sovereignty of the Palestinian state. Subsequently both states will have
an interest in entering negotiations on the remaining issues including: end
of conflict, Jerusalem, security and refugees. But such negotiations will be
on the basis of equality: state to state.
Jerome M. Segal is a Senior Research Scholar at the University of Maryland’s
Center for International and Security Studies. |
