February 13, 2010
Jerome M. Segal |
Today, at
least on a verbal level, the PLO and the Government of Israel are in
agreement that the central outcome of the permanent status
negotiations should be a Palestinian State that will exist alongside
the State of Israel. Broadly speaking, but especially for Israelis,
the understanding of how those two states will interact is one of
strict-separation, "we are here and they are there."
For
Israelis, strict-separation is represented by the wall, or
"separation fence," even though the exact location of final borders
between the two-states is yet to be determined. It is further
reflected in an Israeli determination that no refugees will return,
certainly none "by right." On the Palestinian side, the
strict-separation vision is also widely held. It is expressed in the
Palestinian determination that aside from minor swaps, all Jewish
settlements will be evacuated from whatever land becomes sovereign
Palestinian territory, and in the desire for sharp, straight-line
borders.
The attachment to the strict-separation paradigm of
the two-state solution is so pervasive that at times it leads to a
confusion between the idea of two-states and the idea of
two-homelands. For instance, in the Clinton Parameters we find the
statement, "A new State of Palestine is about to be created as the
homeland of the Palestinian people, just as Israel was established
as the homeland of the Jewish people." Similarly, in the Geneva
Accords we also find the two-states idea intermingled with a
two-homelands idea: "The parties recognize Palestine and Israel as
the homelands of their respective peoples."
This is a
confusion. The concept of "homeland" is quite different than that of
"state". States are political constructions; they are created at
specific points in time as the result of deliberate acts of human
decision-making. But a homeland is a different matter. A
geographical region is the homeland of a people, not because of a
political decision, but in virtue of a people's history and
identification. It is the area from which a people emerged or
flourished and which plays a central role in their own understanding
of themselves. To call something one's homeland is to say something
important about ones self and about how one understands oneself in
relation to the history of the people with which one identifies.
Thus, for Palestinians, while a peace agreement may establish the
West Bank and Gaza as the territory of the Palestinian State, such
an agreement cannot undo the fact that all of historic Palestine is
the homeland of the Palestinian people. Similarly, no political
decision or document can change the fact that the historic homeland
of the Jewish people does not neatly mirror the borders of the State
of Israel. One does not have to accept the religious authority the
Hebrew Bible, to recognize the significance of the fact that in this
ancient text, dating back as far as 2,500 years, the Jewish people
told the story of how Abraham and Isaac and Jacob lived in the
region of what is today Nablus, and how they were buried in what is
now Hebron. Indeed, this ancient Jewish story, which formed Jewish
self-understanding for thousands of years, puts little emphasis on
the coastal plain where most Israelis live today.
The fact
that the Jewish people and the Palestinian people, because of both
history and identity, have one and the same territory as their
common homeland, does not dictate any particular answer to how the
two states should relate to one another. It is quite possible to
decide that within the common homeland, there will be two, strictly
separated states. The problem with this, however, is that precisely
because it flies in the face of the fact that for both peoples, the
homeland is more extensive than the proposed territorial state,
strict-separation has proved particularly hard to negotiate. And if
negotiated it will prove very difficult to implement, and if
implemented, it will be highly unstable. For instance:
- Implementation. While Israeli negotiators have been
willing to agree to the evacuation of most of the settlements in
the West Bank, and one can be optimistic that agreement on the
borders of a Palestinian state can be found, one can also have
severe doubts about implementation. Will any Israeli government
actually have the ability to implement the removal of over 75,000
settlers from the central areas of the West Bank? What if a
significant percentage of the settlers are prepared to resist
their evacuation? Will Israel really fight its own people to
fulfill its treaty commitments?
- Sustainability. If Palestinian negotiators (the PLO
leadership) accept an agreement that provides no accommodation of
Palestinian claims with respect to a right of return, they will be
subject to de-legitimization. If a Palestinian State comes into
existence on that basis, there is far greater likelihood that
Hamas or some successor organization will come to power by winning
the first or second democratic elections within that state. If
that occurs, could a peace accord survive?
- Negotiability. The political implications of abandoning
refugee claims are well understood by the PLO leadership.
Accordingly in past negotiations they have sought from the
Israelis some willingness to allow a credible number of refugees
to return, as well as acceptance, in principle, of a general right
to return. On the other hand while Israeli positions on borders
have become more forthcoming, in recent years the Israeli position
on refugees has hardened. Today there is almost no willingness to
allow the return of any refugees. Thus the strict-separation
paradigm of the two-state solution faces major problems of
negotiability.
Given that a two-state solution
along the strict-separation model does not have high prospects of
being negotiated, implemented and stabilized, it is worth
investigating whether there is a workable alternative model of
two-states. What would the two-state solution look like if rather
than turning away from the underlying reality of the common
homeland, we were to embrace that reality? Here is how this "common
homeland" model for two-states might function:
1. First and
foremost, a peace agreement, rather than centering on the creation
of two-states, would center on mutual recognition that all of the
land between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea, is the
common homeland of the two peoples. The negotiating parties, (e.g.
the PLO and the Government of Israel) would pledge to do their best
to honor the reality of this common homeland. And while they would
concede that the current nature of relations between the two peoples
may not allow for significant implementation, they would affirm
that, in principle, all members of the two peoples, have right to
live anywhere within the common homeland.
2. Then, having
accepted that there is only one homeland, and that it must be
shared, they would agree that at present, and perhaps into the
indefinite future, the only practicable option is to divide the
homeland into two sovereign states, which in the words of UN General
Assembly Resolution 181, are "one Arab and one Jewish." The treaty,
however, would hold out the possibility that over time this
pragmatic decision about two-states could evolve into various
possibilities including a confederation between the two states, or a
single federated state that has two provinces, or even a single
unitary state in which all are equal citizens. The parties would
agree that periodically, (e.g. every ten or fifteen years) they
would convene to explore such possibilities, but that changes would
require the agreement of both states.
3. As a symbol of the
oneness of the homeland, the Old City of Jerusalem would be outside
the realm of political sovereignty. It would be the joint possession
of the two peoples, with the Temple Mount under Palestinian
administration and the Western Wall under Israeli administration.
Possibly, to emphasize the common religious roots of Judaism, Islam
and Christianity (the three Abrahamic religions) it would be
affirmed that with respect to the Old City, sovereignty belongs only
to God.
4. With respect to Jews wishing to live in the West
Bank and Palestinians (whether refugees or not) wishing to live
within Israel, it would be affirmed that within the two-state model,
each state has the ultimate authority over the admission of
non-citizens to the territory of its respective sovereignty. On that
basis, however, the two-states could decide to enter into any of a
variety of experimental programs during a lengthy process of
implementation. Thus, as an example, it might be possible to take a
settlement such as Ariel and while agreeing that the land it is on
is the sovereign territory of the state of Palestine, the two sides
might have a trial program in which Ariel will be matched with an
area inside Israel, an area which is the traditional home of
Palestinian refugees, and that just as Israeli citizens will be
allowed to continue to remain in Ariel, so too will refugees be
allowed to return to live within a new community inside Israel, one
linked to the Palestinian state through special access roads. Such
an arrangement would be done on a trial basis. It would represent
the hope that ways could be found to allow wider implementation of
the right to live anywhere in the homeland. If after several years,
it is found that this is an unworkable idea, then both Ariel and the
parallel area inside Israel would have to be evacuated. Yet even
this, would not be permanent. If after a decade of peace, after a
cooling off period in which a new generation arose, it would remain
possible to again explore the viability of this or other ideas to
give meaningful expression to the oneness of the homeland.
5. With respect to some of the most vexing problems of
security that concern Israelis (e.g. how can they be assured that
ending the occupation will not mean rockets from the West Bank
landing on Ben Gurion Airport) answers must be found which respect
Palestinian sovereignty and the equal dignity of the two states. One
possibility within the Common Homeland model is that there could be
a joint security force that has a presence along the entire external
perimeter of the homeland. Thus, rather than having, as Israel
seeks, Israeli troops on the border with Jordan, there could be a
homeland force that would also be on the borders with Lebanon, and
Syria and Egypt. Again, this would be viewed as experimental, and if
it failed then the fallback would be strict-separation between the
two states with deterrence as the primary factor on which stability
was grounded, but the aspiration would be for cooperation.
6. Economically, the common homeland approach would pursue
the goals of the original Partition Resolution of 1947, (UNGA 181)
articulated in the section on "Economic Union and Transit,"
including a customs union, a joint currency that would replace the
Israeli shekel, common railways, shared ports and airports, as well
as "freedom of transit and visit for all residents or citizens of
both States." As noted in Resolution 181, such freedoms would be
subject to security considerations, but with genuine peace, both
States would be fully open to both peoples.
7. Finally and
of great importance, the common homeland perspective would emphasize
education that would promote the future ability of the two peoples
to genuinely share the same land. This would require a willingness
on the part of both societies to open themselves to learning how the
other side understands itself and understands the history of the
conflict. Neither side would seek to control the curriculum of the
other, but both would agree to allow their youth to learn
first-hand, from the other, their very different perspectives.
At the present moment the relations between the two peoples
are a far distance from what is required to achieve what I have just
described. But it would be a mistake to dismiss this as na?ve. What
it presented here is an ideal to which the parties would pledge
themselves. If we think of the peace negotiations as historic then
we must recognize that in the relations between the two states there
will be ups and downs. And even if at the outset it is decided to
operate along the lines of strict-separation, the common homeland
orientation expresses an intention to achieve a future in which the
two peoples could truly share their common homeland.
Jerome
M. Segal is Research Scholar at the University of Maryland's
Institute for Philosophy and Public Policy. He is the author of
"Creating the Palestinian State: A Strategy for Peace," written in
1988.
(The Arabic original, as published in Al-Quds, is
available here)
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