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Tuesday, 7 February 2006
By:
Jerome M. Segal |
The Hamas electoral victory did not effect a decisive shift of
power or legitimacy from the PLO to Hamas. But it is clearly a major step in
that direction. To the surprise of many observers, Mahmoud Abbas, who
remains
both the president of the Palestinian Authority and chairman of the PLO, is
showing a resolve not previously seen. He is laying down stiff conditions
for the appointment of a Hamas-oriented prime minister; he has told the
heads of the various security services that they must report directly to him
as commander in chief; and he has asserted that the PLO, not Hamas or the
Palestinian Authority, will remain as Israel's counter-part in any peace
negotiations.
Abbas' objective has been unchanged: to achieve a comprehensive
end-of-conflict peace agreement with Israel. Since Arafat's death over a
year ago, he has made little headway in interesting either the Israeli
government or the U.S. government in quickly moving to resume the
negotiations that broke off when Ariel Sharon defeated Ehud Barak five years
ago yesterday. Now, with Sharon permanently incapacitated; with the Likud
Party eclipsed by the new centrist Kadima party; and with the emergence of
Hamas as a central player in Palestinian governance, perhaps he will find a
partner. If he does, there is a good chance that an end-of-conflict
agreement can be reached quickly. But this is the last chance. It must be
seized now.
The idea, at the moment of Hamas' ascendancy, of quickly reaching the
elusive final peace agreement may seem totally fanciful. To see why this
remains possible, it is necessary to better understand what the recent
Palestinian election demonstrated and accomplished.
First, it should be realized that the Palestinian people did not give Hamas
their overwhelming support. Indeed, Hamas did not even win a majority of the
popular vote. Despite the strong component protesting corruption and
lawlessness in the Palestinian Authority, Hamas received 44.4 percent of the
popular vote, only slightly more than the 41.4 percent that went to Abbas'
party, Fatah. Importantly, the remaining 14 percent went to parties that are
both secular in nature and support the two state solution to the conflict.
Secondly, it should be remembered that Abbas himself was elected to the
Palestinian presidency only a year ago, with some 62 percent of the popular
vote. In that election, Hamas did not participate and turnout was lower; yet
in absolute terms, Abbas received more votes than did Hamas in the recent
election.
Third, it is something of a misunderstanding to say that Hamas won the right
to govern the Palestinian Authority. Hamas won 74 out of 132 seats in the
Palestinian Parliament; to this they have a right. However,
Palestinian governance is split between the president, the prime minister
and cabinet, and the parliament. As president, Abbas retains significant
governing
powers, including: the right to propose legislation; the right to veto
legislation (a two-thirds vote of 88 members is required to override a
veto); the right to select and remove the prime minister; ultimate authority
over the security services; the ability to issue Presidential decrees with
the force of law when parliament is not in session; and the ability to
declare a state of emergency in which he has yet additional powers.
And finally, with respect to the all-important issue of peace negotiations,
it is the PLO not the Palestinian Authority that does the negotiating. When
Fatah dominated the PA, this distinction became somewhat obfuscated. But the
PA was created as a temporary authority as a result of Israeli-PLO
negotiations. It was the PLO that signed the Oslo Accords, the PLO that
exchanged letters of recognition with the government of Israel, the PLO that
Rabin designated "the representative of the Palestinian people," and the PLO
that came to Camp David.
Though Abbas retains the will, the authority and the legitimacy to enter
into final status negotiations with Israel, what likelihood is there that
such negotiations could actually, and quickly, result in a comprehensive
end-of-conflict agreement? Virtually no chance, unless a totally new process
is adopted, a Referendum Based Peace Process (RBPP). Here is how it could
work:
1) The United States (or the Quartet) would put on the table a fully
detailed draft peace agreement at the very outset.
2) Israel and the PLO would then negotiate for three months to
see if they can find any mutually agreeable improvements to the American
draft.
3) After three months, the peace treaty, either in its original or its
modified form, will be put to a referendum in both societies. Neither the
PLO nor the Government of Israel would be committed in advance to supporting
passage.
4) If the referenda pass in both societies, then Israel and the PLO would
sign the treaty.
5) As a result of the treaty, the State of Palestine would come into
existence, with the Government of Palestine replacing the Palestinian
Authority.
There is a good deal of polling evidence that shows that a strong majority
of both the Israeli and Palestinian public want a return to final-status
negotiations. Moreover, there is strong evidence that a comprehensive
treaty, roughly along the lines proposed by President Clinton at the end of
his term, could win the approval of both peoples.
Finally, it should not be thought that Hamas would necessarily oppose such a
process. At present Hamas faces dilemmas and responsibilities it did not
anticipate. It faces problems it cannot solve. Hamas wants to see a complete
end to the occupation, and it wants to see a Palestinian State with
Jerusalem as its capital. However, given its refusal to compromise its
ideological premises, it has no viable strategy to bring this about. And
because it cannot do so itself, it is likely to step back and let Abbas and
the Palestinian people make this last try.
The writer is a Senior Research Scholar at the University of Maryland's
Center for International and Security Studies, author of Creating the
Palestinian State: A Strategy for Peace, and founder of The Jewish Peace
Lobby.
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